Tort Recovery for Invasion of Privacy: L.B. 394 (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-201 to -211, 25-804.01 (Supp. 1979)) by Amen, Steven P.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 3 Article 11
1980
Tort Recovery for Invasion of Privacy: L.B. 394
(Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-201 to -211, 25-804.01
(Supp. 1979))
Steven P. Amen
University of Nebraska College of Law, steven.amen@kutakrock.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
Steven P. Amen, Tort Recovery for Invasion of Privacy: L.B. 394 (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-201 to -211, 25-804.01 (Supp. 1979)), 59 Neb. L.
Rev. (1980)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol59/iss3/11
Note
Tort Recovery for Invasion
of Privacy
L.B. 394 (Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 20-201 to -211, 25-804.01
(Supp. 1979)).
The man who is compelled to live every minute of his life among others
and whose every need, thought, desire, fancy, or gratification is subject to
public scrutiny, has been deprived of his individuality and human dig-
nity.1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1890, Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis predicted the
recognition of a cause of action based on the tortious invasion of
the right of privacy.2 After initial rejection by the New York Court
of Appeals 3 the right of privacy as the basis for a tort action was
accepted by the courts of most states4 and was recognized by stat-
ute in several others.5
Causes of action were allowed for invasion of privacy in four
situations: 1) where the defendant made an unauthorized appro-
1. Bloustein, Privacy As An Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Pros-
ser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 962, 1003 (1964).
2. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890). For an
account of the events which inspired Warren and Brandeis to write their arti-
cle, see Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383 (1960).
3. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902). The
court noted that there was a lack of precedent for this type of action, that
recognition of such an action would produce voluminous litigation, and that
freedom of the press would be inhibited as reasons for its decision.
4. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAw OF TORTS 802, 804 (4th ed. 1971), in
which Professor Prosser indicates that as of 1971 only four states did not rec-
ognize the right of privacy: Rhode Island, Nebraska, Texas, and Wisconsin.
Since that time Wisconsin has legislatively adopted the right; WIs. STAT. ANN.
§ 895.50 (West Supp. 1979), and Texas judically recognized it; Billings v. At-
kinson, 489 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. 1973).
5. These include New York, N.Y. Civ. RiGHTs LAw §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976, &
Supp. 1979); Oklahoma, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 839.1 to .3 (West Supp.
1979); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-9-401 to -406 (1978); Virginia, VA. CODE
§§ 2.1-377 to -386 (1979); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.50 (West Supp.
1979).
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priation of the plaintiff's name or likeness for commercial or adver-
tising purposes; 2) where the defendant made a public disclosure
of private facts concerning the plaintiff; 3) where the defendant
published material which placed plaintiff in a "false light"; and 4)
where the defendant intruded upon the plaintiff's solitude or seclu-
sion.6 By 1979, only two states did not recognize a cause of action
for violation of any one of the four recognized categories of pri-
vacy-Rhode Island7 and Nebraska.8
In Brunson v. Ranks Army Store9 the Nebraska Supreme Court
first stated that state law did not recognize a common law right of
privacy. In Brunson the defendant store owner hired the plaintiff,
an actor, for the purpose of staging a re-enactment of the famous
Brink's robbery as an advertising ploy for the defendant's store.
The defendant inadvertently failed to inform the Omaha police of
the plan, and as a result, the plaintiff and his associates were ar-
rested. Newspapers around the country printed accounts of the in-
cident and the defendant ran several newspaper advertisements
concerning the affair without the plaintiff's permission. The plain-
tiff brought an action based on invasion of privacy claiming that
the defendant's actions had humiliated him.
One might argue that the defendant's action in Brunson did not
fall within any of the four recognized categories of the privacy tort.
There was no intrusion upon the plaintiff's solitude nor had de-
fendant published any highly private facts about the plaintiff. The
false light theory would not seem to be applicable, for it requires
an allegation of falsity which the plaintiff was unable to make. The
plaintiff had a possible cause of action for appropriation of his
name or likeness for advertising purposes, but since the plaintiff
had originally taken the job with the defendant in order to adver-
tise the defendant's store, the defendant would have had a fairly
strong defense based on consent.
Rather than holding that the plaintiff had not made out a prima
facie case for any of the four privacy actions, the court simply held
6. This categorization was first espoused by Prosser, supra note 2. The right of
privacy discussed here should be distinguished from the constitutional right
of privacy first announced in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), in
which the Supreme Court extrapolated from the first, third, fourth, fifth and
ninth amendments of the Constitution to find zones or penumbras of privacy
which it found sufficient to reverse appellant's conviction for disseminating
contraceptives to married couples. Future expansion of the constitutional
right of privacy remains unclear. See Baker v. Nelson, 291 Minn. 310, 191
N.W.2d 185 (1971) (constitutional right of privacy does not preclude a state
statutory prohibition of two persons of the same sex from marrying).
7. Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 RI. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909).
8. See note 4 supra.
9. 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
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that a cause of action for invasion of privacy did not exist in Ne-
braska and would not be judicially created:
The doctrine of the right of privacy was not recognized in the ancient
English common law....
Our research develops no Nebraska case holding that this court has in
any form or manner adopted the doctrine of the right of privacy, and there
is no precedent in this state establishing the doctrine. Nor has the Legis-
lature of this state conferred such a right of action by statute. We submit
that if such a right is deemed necessary or desirable, such a right should be
providedfor by action of our Legislature and not by judicial legislation on
the part of our courts. 1 °
The supreme court has since not re-evaluated its position. The
only two privacy actions decided under Nebraska law since Brun-
son were brought in federal court.'1 Both cited Brunson and held
that a cause of action for invasion of privacy could not be main-
tained.
It therefore fell to the Nebraska Legislature to provide a cause
of action for the invasion of privacy. L.B. 394,12 which was signed
by Governor Thone on May 1, 1979, nearly a quarter of a century
after Brunson, establishes such a cause of action. Unlike statutes
which provide more limited causes of action, 13 L.B. 394 is a compre-
hensive piece of legislation. It creates the causes of action for inva-
sion of privacy as well as the defenses to and limitations of those
causes of action. The purpose of this note is to explore the protec-
tion of privacy provided by L.B. 394 in light of the bill's legislative
10. Id. at 525, 73 N.W.2d at 806 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
11. Carson v. National Bank of Commerce Trust and Savings, 356 F. Supp. 811 (D.
Neb. 1973), affid per curiam, 501 F.2d 1082 (8th Cir. 1974); Schmieding v.
American Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., 138 F. Supp. 167 (D. Neb. 1955).
12. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 20-201 to -211, 25-840.01 (Supp. 1979).
13. For example, New York's statute provides only that:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for advertising purposes,
or for purposes of trade, the name, portrait or picture of any living
person without having obtained the written consent of such person,
or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is guilty of a misde-
meanor.
N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 50 (McKinney 1976); and also that:
Any person whose name, portrait, or picture is used within this
state for advertising purposes or for the purpose of trade without the
written consent first obtained as above provided may maintain an eq-
uitable action in the supreme court of this state against the person,
firm or corporation so using his name, portrait or picture, to prevent
and restrain the use thereof; and may also sue and recover damages
for any injuries sustained by reason of such use and if the defendant
shall have knowingly used such person's name, portrait or picture in
such manner as is forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section
fifty of this article, the jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary
damages.
Id. § 51 (McKinney Supp. 1979). Therefore, no protection is provided against
intrusion upon seclusion, publication of private facts, nor for publications
which place the plaintiff in a false light.
[Vol. 59:808
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history, common law origins, and current constitutional limita-
tions.
II. THE PROTECTION OF PRIVACY UNDER L.B. 394
A. The Original Goal
The original intention of the bill's author14 was to codify the
causes of action for invasion of privacy in substantially the same
form as found in the common law, and thus eviscerate the holding
of Brunson.15 That goal, however, does not appear to have been
fully realized in the language of L.B. 394. As the bill advanced
through the legislative process, changes were made to various pro-
visions. The final form of the bill was apparently influenced by in-
14. Senator David Landis (46th District).
15. Senator Landis stated:
The purpose of LB 394 is to respond to the Nebraska Supreme
Court which in Brunson v. Branky [sic] Army Store held that any
right of action for violation of the right of privacy should be created
by the Legislature and not by the Supreme Court. LB 394 would
place Nebraska in the mainstream of American law which gives to
citizens a remedy whenever there has been an unreasonable viola-
tion of their privacy.
LB 394 incorporates the accepted legal definitions of the right of
privacy which safeguard an individual's right against (1) intrusion
upon the plaintiff's physical and mental solitude or seclusion, (2)
public disclosure of private facts, (3) publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye, and (4) appropriation for
the defendant's benefit or advantage of the plaintiff's name or like-
ness for commercial or advertising purposes. The language of the
four components of the right of privacy has been interpreted in hun-
dreds of lawsuits.
Introducer's Statement of Intent, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 29 (Feb. 5,
1979). Remarks of the senator before the Judiciary Committee lend further
support to this proposition:
The first section is merely a statement of intention as to what we
intend to do with this bill: a recognition of the right of privacy and
the desire by the Legislture [sic] to protect that right and to create a
cause of action. The statement of the right exists in Section two,
three and four. This is as best as can be done a statement of a fairly
elusive concept, the right of privacy .... [T]hose are three sections
in which language based on history of court cases going back roughly
60 years is utilized to define as best as possible the rights that are
being protected.
Committee on the Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 11 (Feb.
6, 1979) (remarks of Senator David Landis). And later.
There is no way that I can outline for you every way in which your
right of privacy can be infringed upon. The language in this bill is
vague and it's vague for a reason. The reason is because it contains
concepts which cannot be drawn anymore [sic] particularly than
they are drawn here. It's a matter of giving those to the courts to
enforce and to juries to decide. It's being done in 48 other states and
I think it can be done here.
Id. at 18.
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put from several sources including the media, financial
institutions, and those concerned with the impact of the bill on the
availability of credit information. 16
The principal casualty of the legislative process was the cause
of action for public disclosure of highly private facts. The original
draft of L.B. 394 provided for this cause of action, 17 but it was elimi-
nated from the final version. The "highly private facts" action was
permitted at common law where the plaintiff could establish that
the defendant published facts about the plaintiff that were of a
highly personal and sensitive nature, where such publication
would be highly objectionable to a person of normal sensibilities.18
The plaintiff need not show that the information made public was
untrue, but only that it was of such a private nature that its publi-
cation was extremely offensive to a reasonable person.19 This
cause of action did not provide any protection to a hypersensitive
individual, however,20 nor would an action lie if the facts were
laudatory.2 ' In order to violate the plaintiffs right of privacy the
defendant must have done more that disclose the private facts to a
few individuals: a public disclosure must have been made.22
Since an action for public disclosure of private facts does not
depend on a false statement of fact, this cause of action provides
16. If you will remember we had an [sic] LB 316, the abortion bill, a
statement to [sic] the right of privacy was recognized in this state.
On Select File, by agreement, that was taken out of LB 316. At that
time negotiation was completed between the press, people who are
involved in credit information and banks as to this particular LB.
The decision was made that LB 394 could arrive at [sic] a fair com-
promise and that all opposition to the bill would be dropped .... It
represents a compromise.
Floor Debates, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 2369-70 (Mar. 29, 1979) (Senator
Landis, introducer).
17. The original version of L.B. 394 stated that "[p] ublication or public disclosure
by a person, firm, or corporation of private information about another person
which a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities would object to having
made public shall violate such a person's right of privacy."
18. E.g., Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967 (1927) (defendant store own-
er placed a sign in his store window announcing to all who passed by that the
plaintiff refused to pay a debt). See also Banks v. King Features Syndicate,
30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (x-rays of plaintiffs anatomy); Melvin v. Reid,
112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931) (motion picture based on former life of a
reformed prostitute); Trammell v. Citizens News Co., 285 Ky. 529, 148 S.W.2d
708 (1941) (announcement of debt). But see Timperly v. Chase Collection
Service, 272 Cal. App. 2d 697, 77 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1969) (disclosure of plaintiff's
overdue debt to his employer was not an invasion of privacy).
19. E.g., Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Ca-
son v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So. 2d 243 (1944), rev'd on other grounds on sec-
ond appeal, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947).
20. Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
21. Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co., 122 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
22. Santiesteban v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 306 F.2d 9 (5th Cir. 1962).
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protection beyond and different from the causes of action for defa-
mation and for false light invasion of privacy. Therefore, it would
seem unlikely that the language in L.B. 394 creating the false light
tort23 also creates a cause of action for public disclosure of private
facts since the two actions have different elements. However, L.B.
394 does provide causes of action for the other three recognized
privacy interests. 24 The remainder of this note will be devoted to a
discussion of those provisions.
B. Protection Against Appropriation of Name or Likeness
The common law origins of the cause of action for wrongful ap-
propriation of name or likeness can be traced to Pollard v. Photo-
graphic Co.25 The court there enjoined a photographer from
selling copies of a portrait made for the plaintiff to others on the
ground that such a sale would breach an implied contract between
the photographer and the plaintiff. Justices Warren and Brandeis
noted this case favorably 26 and used it as an illustration of a hold-
ing which protected an individual's right of property "to an involi-
late personality ... .,"27 This cause of action was first clearly
recognized as an invasion of privacy by the Supreme Court of
Georgia which held in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co.28 that
the plaintiff could recover from an insurance company which used
plaintiff's'name and photograph along with a false testimonial in
an advertisement campaign.2 9
Pavesich indicates that the plaintiff must allege and prove that
the defendant used the plaintiff's name or likeness to advertise the
defendant's business or otherwise promote the defendant's com-
mercial interest without plaintiff's expressed or implied consent.3 0
There are more subtle ways of exploiting a person's name or
likeness for business or commercial purposes than to use his or
her name or photograph in advertising. An illustration is found in
Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co.,31 where the defendant signed the
23. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-204 (Supp. 1979).
24. Id. §§ 20-202 to -204.
25. 40 Ch. 345 (1888).
26. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 208-11.
27. Id. at 211.
28. 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
29. The court held that "[t] he right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts
of nature. It is recognized intuitively, consciousness being witness that can
be called to establish it's existence." Id. at 194, 50 S.E. at 69.
30. Id.
31. 166 Or. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941). Although the decision seemed to be based on
unauthorized appropriation of one's name, the case may also be an illustra-
tion of the cause of action for publication which places plaintiff in a false
light. See § 1I-D of text infra.
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plaintiffs name to a telegram sent to the governor urging him to
veto a certain piece of legislation. The court found that the plain-
tiff had stated a valid cause of action based on wrongful appropria-
tion even though there was no statutory basis for recovery in
Oregon. 32 The use of plaintiffs name in this case would appear to
be more political than commercial until one considers that the bill
the defendants sought to have vetoed would have caused the de-
fendants to discontinue their business of fitting eyeglasses. The
lesson is that recovery may be possible even though the defend-
ant's activity appears to be non-commercial on the surface.
Certain individuals may have a privacy interest in distinctive
personal traits other than their names or likenesses which may be
vulnerable to commercial exploitation. For instance, the plaintiff
in Geisel v. Poynter Products, Inc.33 brought suit against a doll
manufacturer who was marketing dolls based on the characters of
"Dr. Suess," the plaintiffs pen name. The action was brought pur-
suant to the New York privacy statute which protects an individ-
ual's "name, portrait or picture" 34 from unauthorized commercial
exploitation. The court refused to allow the cause of action, stating
that "it cannot be doubted that the name 'Dr. Suess' 'was ... used
... for advertising purposes or for the purposes of trade . . .'
within the meaning of Section 51. However, plaintiff cannot suc-
ceed under the right of privacy statute because that statute does
not protect an assumed or trade name. '35
Likewise, the court in Lahr v. Adell Chemical Co.36 denied re-
covery where the question presented was whether the New York
statute protected a person's distinctive physical characteristics
such as voice or manner of speaking. The plaintiff sought recovery
for the wrongful appropriation of his "'style of vocal delivery
which, by reason of its distinctive and original combination of
32. 166 Or. at 503, 113 P.2d at 447.
33. 295 F. Supp. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
34 See note 13 supra.
35. 295 F. Supp. at 355 (citations omitted). But see Gardella v. Log Cabin Prod-
ucts Co., 89 F.2d 891 (2d Cir. 1937), where the court suggested in dictum that
the New York statute does protect stage names. That case is interesting be-
cause it suggests a possible overlap between the right of privacy and the law
of unfair competition. The plaintiff there brought an action based on invasion
of privacy and a second action for unfair competition for using her stage
name "Aunt Jemima." The privacy action was not allowed because defend-
ant held a copyright on that name. However, the court recognized that plain-
tiff had given a secondary meaning to the name Aunt Jemima which
defendant had no right to pass off as its own. Still, no recovery was granted
on this cause of action because plaintiff could not show actual deception of
the public by the defendant's use of the name Aunt Jemima in its radio ad-
vertisements.
36. 300 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1962).
[Vol. 59:808
PRIVACY
pitch, inflection, accent and comic sounds,' has caused him to be-
come 'widely known and readily recognized... as a unique and
extraordinary comic character.' ",37 The plaintiff's voice was that of
a well known cartoon duck. The defendant had produced a televi-
sion advertisement using an animated duck with a voice very simi-
lar to plaintiffs. The court found for the defendant, basing its
opinion on its belief that "[t] he statute is very specific. If the legis-
lature intended that whenever an anonymous speaker extolled a
commercial product a cause of action arose ... if anyone could
claim the voice was mistaken as his, it should have used a phrase
of more general import."38
Denial of recovery in these two cases seems especially onerous
because a person with a well known 'pen name or distinctive per-
sonal characteristic seems to not only have a more valuable inter-
est to protect than the ordinary person has in their name or
picture, but also there would be a greater likelihood of someone
actually misappropriating the identity of a more famous individual.
Under these holdings, "Samuel L. Clemens would have a cause of
action, but Mark Twain would not."'39
Fortunately, different results should be generated by L.B. 394
for at least two reasons. First, the decisions of the New York
courts concerning the scope of protection provided by that state's
privacy statute have been historically restrictive.40 One reason for
that attitude may be that the New York statute4 ' provides criminal
as well as civil sanctions against the wrongful appropriation of
name or likeness. 42 The due process clause of the Constitution 43
requires that criminal statutes not be so vague as to deprive the
citizenry of a fair appraisal of which behavior the state deems ille-
gal 44 This restriction on vagueness may be violated if the New
York courts were to expand the protection of privacy beyond the
literal terms of the statute. The policy reason for strict interpreta-
tion of the New York statute has no application to the interpreta-
37. Id. at 257.
38. Id. at 258.
39. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 805 n.24.
40. See Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc. 2d 329, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1957), where the court
held that the statutory right of privacy would be strictly construed since, ac-
cording to the court, the New York Legislature did not intend to create a gen-
eral right of privacy.
41. See note 13 supra.
42. Id.
43. U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV.
44. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423 (1959) where the Court said that "[a] State
may not issue commands to its citizens, under criminal sanctions, in lan-
guage so vague and undefined as to afford no fair warning of what conduct
might trangress them." 360 U.S. at 438. See also Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S.
284 (1963); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
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tion of the Nebraska right of privacy because L.B. 394 creates no
criminal liability for invasions of privacy.
More significant is the fact that L.B. 394 specifically provides
protection against the unauthorized appropriation of '"personal-
ity."'45 The argument could be made that by including this term in
L.B. 394 the legislature has provided the type of "phrase of more
general import"46 of which Lahr spoke. Therefore a cause of ac-
tion would lie under L.B. 394 for plaintiffs in cases such as Geisel
and Lahr.
L.B. 394 places three limitations on the cause of action for
wrongful appropriation of name or likeness. No cause of action
will lie for the use of the plaintiff's name or likeness to advertise
the sale of artistic productions or other merchandise if the plaintiff
has consented to that use and the use remains within the scope of
that consent.4 7 Second, a cause of action will not arise where the
plaintiff's name was used as part of a bona fide news report.48 The
concern here grows from the fact that newspapers and broadcast-
ers are generally profit-seeking commercial enterprises and thus a
plaintiff whose name or likeness appeared in a news story could
argue that the defendant appropriated his name or likeness for a
commercial purpose-writing and selling a newspaper. This sec-
tion precludes a cause of action in such a situation, and indeed,
such a limitation would appear to be mandated by the first amend-
ment.4
9
Finally, no cause of action will accrue where the plaintiff was
photographed solely as a member of the public.50 This limitation
would deny a cause of action where the defendant used a photo-
graph of a public scene in an advertisement in which the plaintiff
happened to be incidentally captured.51 For example, if the de-
45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202 (Supp. 1979).
46. 300 F.2d at 258.
47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202(2) (Supp. 1979).
48. Id. § 20-202(1).
49. See Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 34 F. Supp. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Williams v. KCMO
Broadcasting Div.-Meredith Corp., 472 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. App. 1971); Colyer v.
Richard K. Fox Pub. Co., 162 App. Div. 297, 146 N.Y.S. 999 (1914); Donahue v.
Warner Bros. Pictures Distributing Corp., 2 Utah 2d 256, 272 P.2d 177 (1954).
50. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-202(3) (Supp. 1979).
51. Senator Landis illustrated the limitation as follows:
For example, you go to a basketball game .... The sports photogra-
pher for the Lincoln Journal turns around, snaps a picture of a piece
of action on the floor and even though they capture the action on the
court they also capture some background people. Well you do not
have a cause of action if you get caught in part of a picture as a part
of the public when you are at a sporting event.
Floor Debates, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 2368 (Mar. 29, 1979). This limita-
tion on the cause of action for wrongful appropriation would also apply where
the photographer was not a journalist. Indeed, the example given by the sen-
[Vol. 59:808
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fendant took a photograph of his place of business during a normal
business day for use in an advertisement and the picture hap-
pened to include some passersby in the area, no cause of action
would seem to lie for these individuals, since their presence in the
photograph was merely incidental.
However, this limitation on the cause of action for wrongful ap-
propriation does not seem to indicate that a person is to be denied
a cause of action simply because he or she happened to be in pub-
lic at the time a photograph was taken. Indeed, if the defendant
singles out a limited number of individuals in a crowd, a cause of
action may lie if the photograph is eventually used for advertising
purposes. 52 If the photograph used in the advertisement was of
one or very few people, those persons would seem to have a cause
of action for appropriation even though they were in public at the
time the photograph was taken. The bill provides only that no
cause of action will exist where the plaintiff was photographed as a
"member of the public", a concept distinct from being photo-
graphed in a public place. At what point the plaintiff becomes a
member of the public-an anonymous face in the crowd-would be
a question of fact in each case.
C. Protection of Solitude and Seclusion
L.B. 394 also provides protection against unreasonable intru-
ator would be better understood under the section of the bill which denies a
cause of action for appropriation when the photograph is taken as part of a
bona fide news report.
52. Discussion of this limitation of the cause of action for wrongful appropriation
before the Unicameral suggests that because one was in public when his pho-
tograph was taken would not necessarily bar a cause of action.
Now another portion of the amendment provides that if a commercial
use is made of a photograph taken of an unnamed individual as a
member of the public, then that is not an invasion of that person's
privacy. What do you mean by a member of the public? Let me give
you an example. If Schlitz Beer Company goes to a Nebraska foot-
ball game and takes a photograph of five cheering members in the
crowd and then uses that photograph to advertise its own wares, is
Schlitz beer exempt from an invasion of privacy or is it not?
Floor Debates, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 2371 (remarks of Senator John-
son).
Senator Landis answered.
I believe in that instance you are talking about a jury question as
to what would be a member of the public and therefore would be
decided in a court of law, however, distinguish between a situation in
which there is a shot of a crowd when you can barely make you own
face and impression out and the place where there are three or four
people only, I think that when you are talking about the public you
are talking about a large number of people and when there are only
two or three people that is really not a member of the public.
1980]
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sions of solitude and seclusion. "Any person, firm, or corporation
that trespasses or intrudes upon any natural person in his or her
place of solitude or seclusion, if the intrusion would be highly of-
fensive to a reasonable person, shall be liable for invasion of pri-
vacy. '5 3 Recovery for this cause of action has been allowed for
invasion of the home or private quarters, 54 wiretapping,5 5 surveil-
lance activities, 56 and eavesdropping.57 It is interesting to compare
the language of L.B. 394 with the statement of the tort found in the
Restatement of Torts58 which reads, "[o] ne who intentionally in-
trudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of
another or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to
the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be high-
ly offensive to a reasonable person."59 These statements, while
generally similiar, contain some important differences. Perhaps
most significant is that L.B. 394 only allows a cause of action if the
defendant has intruded upon a person in his or her place of soli-
tude or seclusion,60 whereas the Restatement does not limit the
tort in such a manner. The original version of L.B. 394 did not con-
53. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-203 (Supp. 1979).
54. Byfield v. Chandler, 33 Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1924); Newcomb Hotel Co. v.
Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S.E. 309 (1921); Welsh v. Pritchard, 125 Mont. 517,
241 P.2d 816 (1952). But see Yoeckel v. Samoning, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925
(1956) where the defendant tavern owner carved out a hole in the womens'
restroom which he used to take photographs of women using the restroom.
He then passed the photographs around to his male customers: held, no lia-
bility.
55. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931); Hamberger v. Eastman,
106 N.H. 107, 206 A.2d 239 (1964); Le Crone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co. 114 Ohio App.
299, 182 N.E.2d 15 (1961).
56. Schultz v. Frankfort Marine Accident & Plate Glass Ins. Co., 151 Wis. 537, 139
N.W. 386 (1913).
57. Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d 716 (La. App. 1956).
58. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
59. Id.
60. The limitation to places was explained by Senator Landis during floor debate:
Section three of the bill creates a cause of action for physical intru-
sion. It says that where a person's solitude, where a person's place
of solitude and seculsion is intruded upon, then there can be a cause
of action. Well in this kind of a situation cases in other jurisdictions
indicate, for example, the use of long range cameras and infared cam-
eras to shoot into your home, for example, or the use of bugging de-
vices or the carving of holes and then the taking of pictures in such
places as telephone booths or restrooms and the like. This section is
premised upon a place or a physical location to which one is reason-
ably entitled to a sense of privacy, a home, an office, a restroom, a
telephone booth that you are occupying or the like and it says that
where there is a physical intrusion into your solitude and seclusion
you may sue for damages.
Floor Debates, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 2368 (Mar. 29, 1979) (emphasis
added).
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tain the limitation to places of solitude.61 Transcripts of the hear-
ings on L.B. 394 before the Judiciary Committee indicate that the
addition of this limitation was suggested primarily by lobbyists
representing the Nebraska Wholesale Suppliers Association and
Media of Nebraska.62 The concern of the Wholesale Suppliers cen-
tered on the possible adverse effect of L.B. 394 on credit investiga-
tions.63
Although the language of the bill might have suggested that a
cause of action would have arisen during a routine credit check,
the case law does not seem to support such a proposition. The
courts have consistently denied causes of action where private
detectives have made investigations of individuals, so long as such
investigations were carried out in a reasonable and unobtrusive
manner.64 Likewise, the rule at common law seems to be that rou-
tine investigations of a person's financial affairs for credit purposes
are not actionable if they are reasonably conducted.65 For in-
stance, in Shorter v. Retail Credit Co.66 the plaintiff brought suit
based, inter alia, on intrusion against a credit company which had
61. The original draft of L.B. 394 stated that "[a]ny person, firm, or corporation
that unreasonably intrudes upon any person's private activities with which
the public has no legitimate concern, in such a manner as to cause mental
suffering, outrage, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary serlsibilities,
shall be liable for invasion of privacy."
62. Committee on the Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 23, 30-31
(Feb. 6, 1979). See also note 16 supra.
63. The concern of the Wholesale Suppliers was explained to the Judiciary Com-
mittee:
The new bill or the amendment to LB 394 still has one concern to us
in it and that's Section three. I would like to address that if I could. I
might say this, that... Section three does raise a problem for us. It
talks about any person, firm or corporation that trespasses or in-
trudes upon a person's solitude or seclusion. The problem we see is
that it isn't limited to a place such as we discussed earlier, but it
could go further and to encompass the concept of a credit inquiry.
This is a problem for the Wholesale Suppliers because as a group
they depend very much on credit bureau information about people
who they have to extend credit to. The Wholesale Suppliers and the
business community in general works from credit bureau reports as
you all know and that's an important part of their making a wise
business decision as to who to give credit to. We're concerned that
the breadth of Section three would give rise to a cause of action for
the use of credit information that has been obtained either before the
effective date of this act or afterwards.
Committee on the Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 30-31
(Feb. 6, 1979) (remarks of Mr. Larry Ruth).
64. Ellenberg v. Pinkertons, Inc., 130 Ga. App. 254, 202 S.E.2d 701 (1973). But see
Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Partridge, 284 Ala. 442, 225 So. 2d 848 (1969); Mc-
Lain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 271 Or. 549, 533 P.2d 343 (1975).
65. Herring v. Retail Credit Co., 266 S.C. 445, 224 S.E.2d 663 (1976). See also J.
SHARP, CREDrr REPORTING AND PRIVACY 52-59 (1970).
66. 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966).
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sent an agent to the plaintiff's residence and questioned his wife in
the course of a credit investigation.67 The court held that no inva-
sion of privacy occurred in that instance and noted that in order for
any plaintiff to recover for intrusion "it is incumbent upon him to
show a blatant and shocking disregard of his rights by the defend-
ant, and serious mental or physical injury or humiliation to himself
resulting therefrom." 68
The Court in Molton v. Commercial Credit Corp.69 held that
when a person applied for a loan and authorized the prospective
lender to secure credit information on him, there was an expressed
or implied authorization for the lender to obtain a report from a
credit bureau concerning the plaintiff's financial status and credit
history. Since loan applicants should expect the lender to investi-
gate their credit reputations, the plaintiffs' privacy had not been
invaded by the act of obtaining credit information. Although there
does not seem to be any strong case law support for the notion that
routine credit checks may invade a person's privacy, the legisla-
ture was apparently persuaded that the particular language in L.B.
394 would possibly be interpreted to provide such a cause of action.
Therefore, the legislature limited the cause of action to "place" in
order to preclude that possibility.
The media also sought to have the language of section three
amended to limit protection from intrusion to places of solitude.
The concern raised by the media centered around the effect of L.B.
394 on the ability of the press to gather the news. These concerns
were outlined before the Judiciary Committee by a spokesperson
for the media:
Section 3 in the white copy says, "any person, firm or corporation that
trespasses or intrudes upon a natural person's solitude or seculsion".
Okay. That's pretty general language, pretty broad language. It is our
view and our suggestion to the Legislature that it would be appropriate to
insert the words "place of solitude of [sic] seclusion."70
I don't think there's any intention to specify any particular place. I think
any place of solitude or seclusion, any room, any place where you could
expect to have privacy, including your office, would certainly be included.
I'm only suggesting that the term place be included to suggest that we're
not saying that somebody walking down a public street or in the public
building can have his privacy intruded upon by say somebody that says
hello, I'd like to talk such and such.7
1
As this comment points out, the basic policy behind the cause of
67. Id. at 329-30.
68. Id. at 332.
69. 127 Ga. App. 390, 193 S.E.2d 629 (1972).
70. Committee on the Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 394 Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 23 (re-
marks of Mr. Alan Peterson).
71. Id. at 23-24.
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action for intrusion is to protect the expectations of privacy of a
reasonable individual. The concern of the media, on the other
hand, seems to lie in not allowing a cause of action where a per-
haps overly-persistent reporter seeks an interview from an unwill-
ing person in a public place. Since the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Branzburg v. Hayes,72 many courts have recog-
nized a qualified right to gather news which is protected by the
first amendment.73
In Dietemann v. Time, Inc.,7 4 the question before the court was
whether the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press and
the obligation of the news media to inform the public superseded
an individual's claim of privacy. In that case the plaintiff was en-
gaged in the practice of healing with clay, minerals and herbs. Two
employees of defendant, in the course of investigating an article
entitled "Crackdown on Quackery," approached plaintiff at his
home under the pretext of seeking medical treatment. The report-
ers were admitted into the plaintiffs home and during the course
of treatment of one of the reporters, the other secretly photo-
graphed the plaintiff with a concealed camera and transmitted the
conversation with a hidden transmitter to a third associate in a car
outside who was recording it. These photographs along with mate-
rial taken from the recording were published by the defendant in a
newsmagazine article depicting the plaintiff as a quack.7 5
The plaintiff brought an action for intrusion and was awarded a
judgment for injury to his feelings and peace of mind from which
the defendants appealed. The court of appeals affirmed, stating
that
[a]lthough the issue has not been squarely decided in California, we have
little difficulty in concluding that clandestine photography of the plaintiff
in his den and the recordation and transmission of his conversation with-
out his consent resulting in his emotional distress warrants recoveri for
invasion of privacy in California.
7 6
The court then dealt with the defendants' claim that the first
amendment immunized them from liability for invading plaintiffs
den with a concealed camera and microphone because its employ-
ees were gathering news. The court rejected this contention;
72. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
73. The Court stated in dictum that "[w] e do not question the significance of free
speech, press, or assembly to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that
news gathering does not qualify for First Amendment protection; without
some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could be evis-
cerated." Id. at 681. See CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234 (6th Cir. 1975); Bor-
reca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906 (D. Haw. 1974). But see Gannent Co. v.
DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979); Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1 (1978).
74. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
75. Id. at 247.
76. Id. at 248.
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"[t]he First Amendment has never been construed to accord
newsmen immunity from torts and crimes committed during the
course of newsgathering. The First Amendment is not a license to
trespass, to steal, or to intrude by electronic means into the pre-
cincts of another's home or office."'77
The defendants contended, however, that their actions were
privileged under the Supreme Court's ruling in New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan,78 which held that in an action for defamation in-
volving a public official the plaintiff must allege and prove that the
defendant knew of the falsity of the published material or acted in
reckless disregard as to whether it was true or not,7 9 and Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,80 which held that this same standard of
"actual malice" also applies in actions brought by any person con-
nected with an event of public interest. The defendants contended
that since plaintiff was engaged in activity in which the public had
a legitimate interest, they were protected since the plaintiff had
not proven actual malice. The court in Dietemann held that since
publication is not an element of the cause of action based on intru-
sion, the privilege concepts developed in defamation cases were
not applicable. 8 '
While the right of privacy prevailed in Dietemann, the court in
Pearson v. Dodds2 dealt with a fact pattern in which the need to
gather news seemingly outweighed the claim of privacy. In Pear-
son the plaintiff, a United States Senator, brought suit against two
newspaper columnists, alleging that the manner in which they had
collected the information used in certain articles was an invasion
of his privacy. The plaintiff proved that on several occasions two
former employees of the plaintiff had entered the plaintiff's office
without authority and unbeknown to the plaintiff removed certain
documents from his files, made photocopies of them, replaced the
originals, and turned the copies over to the defendants who were
aware of the manner in which they had been obtained.83 The de-
fendants read through these private files and published their con-
tents. The plaintiff contended that receiving and viewing
documents from his personal files constituted an intrusion upon
his privacy.
The court held that the right of privacy for intrusion was recog-
nized in the District of Columbia and pointed out that the action
77. Id. at 249.
78. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
79. Id. at 279-80.
80. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
81. 449 F.2d at 249-50.
82. 410 F.2d 701 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
83. Id. at 703.
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for intrusion does not depend on publication as do the other three
categories of the privacy tort, saying, "[t] he tort is completed with
the obtaining of the information by improperly intrusive means. '84
The court was unwilling, however, to hold that liability attached for
merely receiving and reading copies of documents with the knowl-
edge that they had been removed without authorization:
If we were to hold appellants liable for invasion of privacy on these facts,
we would establish the proposition that one who receives information
from an intruder, knowing it has been obtained by improper intrusion, is
guilty of a tort. In an untried and developing area of tort law, we are not
prepared to go so far. A person approached by an eavesdropper with an
offer to share in the information gathered through the eavesdropping
would perhaps play the nobler part should he spurn the offer and shut
ears. However, it seems to us that at this point it would place too great a
strain on human weakness to hold one liable in damages who merely suc-
cumbs to temptation and listens.85
The court in Pearson seemed to give deference to the reporter's
right to receive information as long as the reporter was not the one
actually intruding into a place of solitude.
As Deitemann and Pearson illustrate, there is a basic inconsis-
tency in the attempt of the law to afford individuals the right to
protect private aspects of their lives from the scrutiny of others,
including the press, while simultaneously insuring that the ability
to gather news is not unduly hampered by privacy lawsuits. The
solution to this dilemma lies in striking some acceptable balance
between the two interests. Under L.B. 394, that balance would ap-
pear to be struck by restricting the cause of action to intrusions of
places. The solution under L.B. 394 would likely be the same as
reached by the courts in the two cases discussed above. In a situa-
tion like Deitemann, a cause of action would lie under L.B. 394
since the plaintiffs home was physically intruded upon by the de-
fendants in the course of their newsgathering activity. However, in
the situation suggested by Pearson, no action would be allowed be-
cause, even though the defendants read through the plaintiff's
secret ifies, and actually pried into matters in which the plaintiff
had an expectation of privacy, they had not personally physically
intruded into a place in which the plaintiff could expect solitude.
The design of L.B. 394 strikes the balance in favor of news gather-
ing in such a situation. The legislature apparently felt that permit-
ting a plaintiff to recover for invasion of privacy in this type of case
would present a threat to a journalist's ability to gather news-
worthy information.
On the other hand, the drawback of using the word "place" as
the line of demarcation between the policies favoring the media's
84. Id. at 704.
85. Id. at 705.
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ability to gather news and those favoring rights of privacy is graph-
ically illustrated by Galella v. Onassis.8 6 That case arose with a
personal injury action brought by a newsphotographer against the
defendant and her bodyguards. The defendant fied a counter-
claim seeking to enjoin the plaintiff from constantly and closely
following her for the purpose of photographing her. The district
court granted the injunctive relief:
First let us reconsider plaintiff's close-shadowing of defendant. Contin-
uously he has her under surveillance to the point where he is notified of
her every movement. He waits outside her residence at all hours .... He
follows her about irrespective of what she is doing: trailing her up and
down the streets of New York, chasing her out of the city to neighboring
places and foreign countries. . . , haunting her at restaurants (recording
what she eats), theatres, the opera and other places of entertainment, and
pursuing her when she goes shopping, getting close to her at the counter
and inquiring of personnel as to her clothing purchases.
As we see it, Galella's conduct falls within the formulation of the right
of privacy .... 87
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, while limiting the scope
of the injunction imposed by the district court, affirmed:
Of course legitimate countervailing social needs may warrant some in-
trusion despite an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy and free-
dom from harassment .... Nonetheless, Galella's action went far beyond
the reasonable bounds of newsgathering...
Galella does not seriously dispute the court's finding of tortious con-
duct. Rather, he sets up the First Amendment as a wall of immunity pro-
tecting newsmen from any liability for their conduct while gathering news.
There is no such scope to the First Amendment right. Crimes and torts
committed in news gathering are not protected.... There is no threat to
a free press in requiring its agents to act within the law.
8 8
Under L.B. 394 it is doubtful that a plaintiff faced with a situation
such as found in Galella would have a cause of action because the
affronts on the plaintiff there were all made in public places. In-
86. 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973), affg, 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). This case is
interesting because it was supposedly decided under New York law which
only recognizes a cause of action for the unauthorized appropriation of a per-
son's name or likeness for commercial or advertising purposes, and according
to Cardy v. Maxwell, 9 Misc. 2d 329, 169 N.Y.S.2d 547 (1957), the New York
statute is to be strictly construed. The Galella court did not discuss Cardy
but based its holding on its feeling that the New York courts would no longer
follow the holding in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64
N.E. 442 (1902). This reasoning is suspect because Roberson was an unautho-
rized appropriation case. It did not discuss the other right to privacy causes
of action. Moreover, Roberson was legislatively overruled. The New York
statutes do not provide a cause of action for intrusion. For the court to decide
that New York would hold that a cause of action for intrusion would be recog-
nized seems a bit wishful.
87. Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 227-28 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
88. 487 F.2d at 995-96 (citations omitted).
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deed, a statement by the spokesperson for the media at the Judici-
ary Committee hearings indicated that such a result was
contemplated by the inclusion of the word place: "I'm thinking of
the Onassis case which was pretty close when the photographer
kept taking photos of Jackie Onassis .... I think there are other
remedies rather than calling that a breach of privacy." 89 By limit-
ing the cause of action for intrusion to places of solitude or seclu-
sion the legislature appears to have weighted the balance in favor
of the press's ability to gather news, even in situations such as
Galella in which that ability is abused, at the expense of individ-
ual privacy.
D. False Light
The final protection of privacy provided by L.B. 394 prevents the
publication of material which places the plaintiff in a false light in
the public eye.9 0 This cause of action will lie when the defendant
publishes information which creates a misleading impression
about the plaintiff in the mind of the public of the type which a
normal person would find highly objectionable. Recovery has been
allowed where the defendant used the picture of an honest taxi
driver to illustrate an article on the practices employed by taxi
drivers to cheat their customers,9 ' or where the plaintiff was de-
picted as a "man hungry" woman,92 or by attributing to the plaintiff
a statement which he did not make.93
This right of recovery appears to have more in common with the
tort of defamation than with the other privacy torts. The quintes-
cence of the false light action is the protection of the plaintiff's rep-
utation rather than his or her right to be free from the public's
scrutiny. If this cause of action were truly directed towards pro-
tecting that which the plaintiff seeks to keep private, one must
wonder why the tort requires that the information published cre-
ate a false impression? Would not the publication of a highly per-
sonal but completely true fact be more injurious to a person's
sense of privacy than the publication of erroneous information?94
Recovery for false light invasion of privacy seems to be allowed in
those cases where the false statement about the defendant did not
quite rise to the level of defamation, unless one were to take a very
89. Committee on the Judiciary, Minutes, L.B. 394, Neb. Leg., 86th Sess. 25 (Feb. 6,
1979) (statement of Mr. Alan Peterson).
90. NEin. REV. STAT. § 20-204 (Supp. 1979).
91. Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948). See also Valerni v.
Hearst Magazines, Inc., 99 N.Y.S.2d 866 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
92. Martin v. Johnson Pub. Co., 157 N.Y.S.2d 409 (Sup. Ct. 1956).
93. Goldberg v. Ideal Publishing Corp., 210 N.Y.S. 928 (Sup. Ct. 1960).
94. This is the very protection which the legislature eliminated from IB. 394.
See § 11-A of text supra.
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broad view of reputational harm.95 However, articulating the dis-
tinction between defamation and false light privacy actions is ex-
tremely difficult. Both torts require publication.96 Defamation
requires the publication of a false statement of fact that the trier of
fact believes is injurious to the plaintiff's reputation,97 while false
light requires the publication of information which creates a false
impression about the plaintiff. Arguably, however, it will be rather
unusual for a false impression to be created without some false
statement of fact. Indeed, it seems that in most cases of defama-
tion the plaintiff would be able to bring an alternative cause of ac-
tion for creation of a false light. This fact suggests that there is no
logical reason for maintaining the distinction between these
causes of action.
The similarity between the two torts suggests that they present
similiar dangers to first amendment rights, and therefore, they are
both subject to similiar limitations.98 L.B. 394 restricts recovery for
false light to those cases where: (1) the false light is highly objec-
tionable to a reasonable person 99 and; (2) the defendant had
knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the
publicized matter and the false light in which the plaintiff would be
placed. 100 This second limitation adopts the holding of the United
States Supreme Court in Time, Inc. v. Hill.10 1 That case grew out
of a: story in the defendant's magazine concerning a Broadway play
which was loosely based on an incident where the plaintiff and his
family had been held hostage in their home by three escaped con-
victs. The play contained scenes of violence which were clear de-
partures from the actual happenings. However, the plaintiff
contended that the story in the magazine implied that the play was
factually correct and that this implication was reinforced by pub-
lishing photographs of some of the actors recreating scenes from
the play at the actual house in which the plaintiff's family had been
held. The plaintiff sued, claiming that the article placed him and
his family in a false light. The Court denied the action:
In New York Times v. Sullivan,... we held that the Constitution delimits
a State's power to award damages for libel in actions brought by public
officials against critics of their official conduct. Factual error, content de-
famatory of official reputation, or both, are insufficient for an award of
damages for false statements unless actual malice-knowledge that the
statements are false or in reckless disregard of the truth-is alleged and
proved ....
95. See notes 91-93 supra.
96. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
97. Grant v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 151 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1945).
98. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
99. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-204(1) (Supp. 1979).
100. Id. § 20-204(2).
101. 385 U.S. 374 (1967). The attorney for the appellee was Richard M. Nixon.
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We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and press preclude
the application of the New York [privacy] statute to redress false reports
of matters of public interest in the absence of proof that the defendant
published the report with knowledge of its falsity or in reckless disregard
of the truth.
10 2
Since the plaintiff was unable to show that the defendant had ac-
ted with knowledge of the falsity created by the article, or in reck-
less disregard of the truth, recovery was denied.
In defamation cases the holding in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van10 3 that actual malice is required to be proven by the plaintiff
has been limited to the context of an action brought by a public
offical or figure. This position was espoused by the Supreme Court
in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,10 4 where the defendant published an
article which implied that the plaintiff, an attorney representing
the family of a youth killed by a policeman, was a communist sym-
pathizer and involved in a nation-wide plot to discredit police. The
Court felt that the plaintiff's connection with a public event was
too tenuous to apply the actual malice standard to his action for
libel. Private individuals would not be required to allege and prove
actual malice. The Court held that "so long as they do not impose
liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the ap-
propriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of de-
famatory falsehood injurious to a private individual."'105 Gertz held
that the allegation of actual malice was not constitutionally re-
quired in a defamation action brought by a private individual.
However, the Court did not indicate if the same was true for an
action for false light. Indeed, during the same term the Court
stated in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co. 10 6 that the question
remained open.10 7
102. Id. at 387-88 (citations omitted).
103. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
104. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
105. Id. at 347. See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976), where the
Court described a public figure for purposes of the first amendment as fol-
lows:
For the most part those who obtain this status have assumed roles of
especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions
of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public
figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public
figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved.
448 U.S. at 453 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welsh, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
106. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
107. The Court stated that since the judge below instructed the jury that they
must find actual malice before it could find in favor of the plaintiff, the case
offered no opportunity to decide the question of whether the actual malice
standard is constitutionally mandated for false light actions brought by pri-
vate individuals. See also Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 498
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L.B. 394 draws no distinction between privacy actions initiated
by public officals and those brought by private individuals. The
requirement of alleging and proving actual malice apply to both
classes of plaintiffs. Additionally, the knowledge which plaintiffs
must prove is not only that the defendant knew or acted in reck-
less disregard of the untruth of the publication, but that he also
knew or acted in reckless disregard of the false light in which the
plaintiff would be placed.108 This would seem to be an even
stricter standard than the Supreme Court imposed in Time, Inc. v.
Hill.
L.B. 394 also makes section 25-840.01 applicable to false light ac-
tions.'0 9 Under that section the plaintiff is limited to recovery of
special damages unless he has requested the defendant to retract
the offending publication. It is interesting to note that subsection 2
of section 25-840.01 states that the limitation of that section does
not apply if the plaintiff alleges and proves "actual malice." Since
recovery for false light can only be had when the plaintiff shows
that the defendant acted with what the Supreme Court called "ac-
tual malice," the retraction statute would not seem to apply to any
case of false-light invasion of privacy if the term "actual malice"
was interpreted consistently throughout. It seems more likely that
this was simply an oversight by the legislature since the words "ac-
tual malice" in the retraction provision first appeared long before
the Supreme Court defined them to mean knowledge of or reckless
disregard towards falsity."o To interpret the statute otherwise
would be to say that in one section the legislature made the retrac-
tion provision applicable to false light torts but in a later section it
used language which effectively made the retraction provision in-
applicable to false light actions.
n.2 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring) ("[i]n neither Gertz nor our more recent
decision in Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.. . . however, have we been
called upon to determine whether a State may constitutionally apply a more
relaxed standard of liability under a false-light theory of invasion of pri-
vacy.").
108. NEB. REV. STAT. § 20-204(2) (Supp. 1979).
109. 1979 Neb. Laws, L.B. 394, § 12.
110. The retraction statute was originally enacted in 1957, and the term "actual
malice" first appeared at that time. 1957 Neb. Laws, L.B. 318, § 2(2). Malice in
defamation cases had been variously defined, but it generally denoted that
the defendant was motivated by ill will, personal spite, wrongful motive, or
wanton disregard of the plaintiff's rights. See Hassett v. Carroll, 85 Conn. 23,
81 A. 1013 (1911); Cherry v. Des Moines Leader, 114 Iowa 298, 86 N.W. 323
(1901). The Nebraska Supreme Court defined malice as "bad intent in the
publisher; i.e., an intent to injure the person whom or whose affairs the lan-
guage concerns." Peterson v. Cleaver, 105 Neb. 438, 442, 181 N.W. 187, 189
(1920). The United States Supreme Court did not give the term "actual mal-
ice" the definition of knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard of the
truth until it decided New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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E. Defenses and Limitations
As mentioned previously, L.B. 394 also provides several de-
fenses and limitations on the right to recover for an invasion of
privacy. Under the bill no cause of action will lie if the plaintiff has
consented to the alleged invasion of privacy, as long as the defend-
ant's actions were within the scope of that consent."' The cause of
action is not assignable 112 nor does it survive the death of the in-
jured party, except in cases of appropriation of name or likeness
for business or advertising purposes." 3 A plaintiff is limited to one
cause of action for libel, slander or invasion of privacy arising out
of a single publication," 4 and a judgment in any jurisdiction for or
against the plaintiff upon the merits of his action founded upon a
single publication will bar any future action based upon the same
publication." 5 The bill also imposes a limitations period of one
year on all causes of action for invasion of privacy.1 6 In an appar-
ent attempt to insure that no stone was left unturned, the legisla-
ture added a provision which purports to adopt all applicable state
and federal statutory or constitutional defenses, all qualified and
absolute privileges to defamation, and all other privileges and de-
fenses to privacy actions found in the common law of any state." 7
III. CONCLUSION
Tort recovery for invasion of privacy rights was long overdue in
Nebraska and the legislature should be applauded for finally pro-
viding for it. The provisions of L.B. 394 were designed to reflect the
protection of privacy developed at common law, although certain
aspects of that protection seem to have been modified or limited
during the legislative process. Particular deference seems to have
been given to the desire of the media that the new right of privacy
not interfer with its ability to gather and disseminate the news.
The elimination of the cause of action for publication of private
facts, the restriction of the intrusion tort to invasions of places, and
the requirement in false light actions that actual malice be alleged
and proven for all classes of plaintiffs, all seem to have the media's
interest at heart.
The task now falls on the judiciary to define and apply the
protection of L.B. 394. This should be made somewhat easier by
the common law history of the right of privacy, since it was from
111. NEB. REv. STAT. § 20-205 (Supp. 1979).
112. Id. § 20-207.
113. Id. § 20-208.
114. Id. § 20-209.
115. Id. § 20-210.
116. Id. § 20-211.
117. Id. § 20-206.
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this background that L.B. 394 emerged. Nebraska's right of privacy
was not created in a vacuum. It is the child of the common law
right of privacy, and therefore, its protections should always be
viewed with that legacy in mind.
Steven P. Amen '81
